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A Moral Critique of Development: 
Ethics, Aesthetics and Responsibility 
 
Ananta Kumar Giri & Philip Qarles Van Ufford∗
 
 
 
There is a fundamental criticism of the IMF / Washington consensus 
approach: It does not acknowledge that development requires a 
transformation of society.  Uganda grasped this in its radical elimination all 
school fees, something that budget accountants focusing solely on revenues 
and costs simply could not understand. 
 
 (Joseph Stiglitz (2002), “Globalization and its Discontents”, p. 76) 
 
 
Human beings are not only the most important means of social development, 
they are also its profoundest end. Being a fine piece of capital is not the most 
exalted state that can happen to a human being. 
  
(Amartya Sen (1998), “Human Development and Financial Conservatism”, 
p. 734) 
 
 
 
The Problem 
 
The discourse and practice of development is at a critical juncture now. The idea 
of development in its present interventionist mode had originated at the end of the 
Second World War as a new vision of hope against the backdrop of the 
devastating experiences of the war and the rising process of decolonisation. At this 
juncture, the idea of development shaped new forms of political responsibility on 
a global scale. It gave rise to many applications. Now, after more than fifty years 
development has gradually lost its appeal and vitality. We are facing a crisis, not 
knowing how to move on in a meaningful way. We now face a crisis in a 
foundational way and in terms of major transformations at the macro level as 
well as in our daily routines in the world of development. In our daily routines 
of development we face disjunctures and lack of communication between 
different domains of development, for example, as we shall shortly discuss this 
theme more elaborately, development as hope and development as politics and 
                                                          
∗ Ananta Kumar Giri, originally from Madras Institute of Development Studies, India is 
currently a Visiting Associate Professor at the Research Center on Development and 
International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark and Philip Quarles van Ufford is at the 
Department of Cultural Anthropology and Non-Western Sociology, Free University, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands (email: flipq@dds.nl). 
 1
administration. We also face disjunctures and incompatibilities of perspectives 
among different kinds of actors engaged in the field of development--state, 
market and voluntary organizations and between the advocates and critics. But 
our prevalent approach seems to be ignoring these disjunctures in the name of an 
ideal model of development or in terms of a self-righteous closure that if there is 
incommensurability then the way to proceed is to assert one’s a priori logic. For 
example, in the contemporary practice of development there is a disjunction 
between one-sided emphasis on state and market, or between an interventionist 
approach to development and a people’s self-initiated model of development, or 
between an applied approach to development and critical approach.  But the way 
of overcoming this disjunction is not to assert one’s own perspective and 
positionality but to participate in mutual and multilateral conversation and 
learning which leads to transformation of initial incommensurability and 
emergence of a connected point of view and mode of praxis.  
 
In this paper we describe the moral crisis we face in our daily routines of 
development in terms of disjunctures that different actors face in the field of 
development. This disjuncture we argue involves both knowledge and action—
disjuncture between different knowledges of development such as development 
as hope, development as politics and administration, and development as critical 
scientific understanding; disjunction between different actors of development—
donor agencies and beneficiaries, market and the tribal people; and the 
disjuncture between values and practices of application, of between value and 
norm.  One major aspect of our contemporary crisis is the growing gap between 
action and reflection. We speak of a moral crisis because in the development 
enterprise the actors have lost sight of meaningful linkages between developmental 
action and intervention on the one hand, and of reflective understanding on the 
other.  The dynamics of ‘doing’, of coping with the future of our common global 
responsibilities, and of ‘understanding’ past experiences have become separated. 
Both have become erratic undertakings. Therefore we need to gain a new 
perspective in which the understanding of our past experiences with the enterprise 
of  ‘applied development’ in the last fifty years and the search for new global 
concerns and responsibilities come together in a meaningful way. In order to gain 
such a perspective we must discern some of the important transformations, which 
have taken place in both the domains of action and reflection. 
 
Within the world of action we witness a transition from development interventions 
as expressive of specific political responsibilities towards a notion of development 
in which the issue of manageability has taken central stage. The focus of moral 
and political reasoning has shifted from goals to results.  In the world of reflection 
we have seen a shift from modernist faith in development towards the post-
modern, de-constructive critiques of it. These two processes taking place since the 
nineteen eighties in each of the two domains gradually widened the gap between 
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action and reflection. The domains of critical understanding and of developmental 
action became increasingly separated from each other. This disjunction, and the 
moral/ethical quandary it implies, underlies the present impasse. In this context, 
reinvigoration of development requires a sustained effort to reconnect the worlds 
of action and reflection, engagement in bridge building and border crossing, 
keeping pace with or even anticipating multiple transformations of criticism and 
reconstruction. 
 
But for this task of reconstruction, we need to understand that though there has 
been a shift from “must do” to “can do” in the field of action, both of them reflect 
generalizing, universalising models of development ignoring the contingent nature 
of action and morality. We shall shortly show, how the managers of development 
who are our new priests of a “can do” mode apply models of market, efficiency 
and outcome universally to all situations of action and moral engagement without 
realizing that the contemporary emphasis on market had arisen in specific 
historical circumstances and while during the 1980s it had a liberative appeal in 
the context of ideological orthodoxy of “must do”, a universaliation of the “can 
do” principle now without consideration for contingencies of time, space and 
relationships leads to another ideological orthodoxy. In the field of ethics and 
morality also both the “must do” and the “can do” apply a universalising approach 
which annihilates disjunctures and contingencies in the world of development. In 
the world of reflection the shift from modernist views of development as “applied 
enlightenment” to post-modern views of development as domination also does not 
involve a foundational shift.  Both these shifts are within the frames of “rights” 
and “justice” discourses of modernity and lack a transformational engagement 
with the emergent discourse and practice of responsibility. 
 
This later issue of responsibility constitutes a foundational problem which 
contemporary shifts in development-either from the political masters to 
managers, or from development as hope-generating machine to development as 
dystopia—are completely unreflective about. For example when we propound a 
market redefinition of development or a Foucauldian critique of development as 
hegemony we are still operating with development as rights and justice but what 
needs to be understood that the rights and justice frames had emerged in specific 
historical circumstances and now these frames need to be radically and 
transformationally supplemented by a practice and perspective of responsibility. 
The crisis in daily routines and paradigms of development that we now face can 
be better illumined if we relate this to our clinging to only “rights” and “justice” 
frames of modernity and lack of willingness to accept the calling of 
responsibility. In his provocative work, Discourse and Knowledge: The Making 
of Enlightenment Sociology, Piet Strydom (2000) helps us understand this 
foundational problem. For Strydom the rights frame had emerged in the early 
modern revolutions e.g., the Revolt of the Netherlands, the English Revolution 
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and the French Revolution. The justice frame had arisen in the wake of 
industrial revolution in “late eighteenth century England and continued unabated 
yet in a sublimated form until the second half of the twentieth century, focused 
on the problem complex of exploitation, pauperisation and loss of identity.” 
(Strydom 2000: 20). These two discourses have inspired and influenced socio-
political movements in the modern world including interventions of 
development but they have now their limits to come to terms with the emergent 
challenge and calling of responsibility. For example, to come to terms with 
environmental crisis and the attendant calling of responsibility discourses of 
rights and justice and politics and policies revolving around these have their 
limits.1 In face of such challenges, in Strydom’s pregnant formulations, “The 
theory of justice is today making way for another, still newer semantics in the 
form of the moral theory of responsibility which is crystallizing around a 
number of intertwined debates about the problem of risk” (Strydom 2000: 20). 
 
Thus the calling of responsibility constitutes a critical juncture for us, one that is 
heightened by the rise of a risk society, both locally and globally. In fact problems 
of poverty, rights, injustice and now the valorized problem of terrorism can be 
looked at as part of our risk condition but our approach to such risks have to be 
one of responsibility, a responsible engagement. But responsibility for us does not 
mean only political responsibility but also ethico-moral and spiritual 
responsibility, embodying co-responsibility.2 At the same time, modes of 
responsible engagement do not emerge only from the public sphere, as Strydom 
seems to suggest in a Habermasian mode, but involves practices of self-cultivation 
including spiritual mobilization of self and society. In fact it is the perspective and 
practice of responsibility emerging from multidimensional practices of care of self, 
looking up to the face of the other, and being part of conversations and civil labor 
in the public sphere, that constitutes the moral critique of development that await 
us (cf. Beck 2000; Giri 2002a, 2002b).  
 
The field of development has been subjected to a Foucauldian critique in the 
works of scholars such as Arturo Escobar (1995), which valorises political 
criticism, but this now needs to be radically supplemented by a moral critique and 
reconstructive responsibility. A moral critique however does not proceed with an 
opposition between politics and morality but contains interpenetrative critical 
moments and possibilities between politics and morality acknowledging the limits 
of an either-or-approach, and always inspired by a beyond, a transcendence that 
exists within these immanent domains. Moral critique and engagement here is not 
bound to the semantic distinction between ethics and morality that bedevils 
contemporary moral philosophy: it includes both Habermasian moral 
argumentation and Levinasian ethics of the face,3 and radically supplements both 
of these with a Gandhian practice of spiritual critique and responsibility. A moral 
critique of development includes both practices of ethical responsibility and 
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aesthetic self-cultivation—responsibility to the other and the care of the self—but 
acknowledges the gaps that exist between the two and contains within it creative 
modes of dealing with these rather than suppressing them in the name of an ideal 
model of unity or for the sake of “order,” “truth,” and “certainty”. A moral critique 
of development also includes a foundational critique of development by posing 
such questions whether development means only economic development or 
political empowerment and whether the contemporary redefinition of development 
in terms of Amartya Sen’s “functioning” and “capability” is adequate to challenge 
of developing one’s mind and heart (cf. Sen 1999).  
 
 
A Moral Critique of Development: 
Aspects of Our Contemporary Predicament 
 
(a) The shift from ‘Must do’ to ‘Can do’: The changing definitions of 
manageability and the new cult of accountability 
The first dimension of the contemporary crisis of development concerns the 
macro level, the level at which the rules for development interventions are 
defined. Here, the primacy of global political responsibility, of planned change 
in the various ways and forms we have witnessed in the past, is evaporating. The 
very notion of development as a project of political engagement and 
responsibility is now seen increasingly as anachronistic, i.e. as belonging to a 
by-gone past. Current confidence is in the market as harbinger of development. 
As Michael Edwards (1999: 8-9) states: ‘The market is the only proven 
mechanism of economic integration since no other can respond to the constant 
signalling that complex systems demand.’ Primacy is now attributed to the role 
of free enterprise, free trade and the market in the quest for development.  
 
This shift to market is much more encompassing than it seems. It aims at 
transforming society as a whole into a ‘market society’. The metaphor of the 
market deeply penetrates the conventions of steering, understanding and justifying 
the modes of operation of the non-market sector also, public and private. 
Government departments, NGO’s and private organisations active in the domains 
of development are required to operate as if they were business: there is no place 
for them unless they are able to show results. A new definition of legitimacy of 
good policy comes forward. As Max van den Berg, until recently the director of 
NOVIB, a major Dutch NGO, describes the changing modus operandi of his 
agency: “Who speaks of the market, must take into account ‘suppliers’ of 
development as well as customers, a product and a buyer” (Van den Berg 1998: 
132). Though the emphasis on result and market evolved from many failures of 
experiments of political planning or “high modernism” earlier on (e.g. Crew & 
Harrison 1998; Scott 1998) soon this has become a cult into itself. 
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The implications of this shift to market, however, are wide. The new discourse 
gives rise to a new a-historical morality. New general criteria and rules for 
judging and steering interventions in development arise irrespective of any 
historical context. Issues of management come to the fore in the ‘business of 
commitment’. A new regime steers development intervention, with the 
formation of a new class of management experts in all sorts of guises for whom 
substantive issues of political responsibility are not vitally important anymore.4 
Manageability now became an end onto itself, leading to a drastically new 
definition of good policy, with ‘accountability’ the corner stone of a new 
doctrine (cf. Strathern 2000). A new ethics emerges focussed on outcomes of 
interventions and the issues of manageability of results. The capacity of 
professionals and the agencies to actually deliver promised results now 
constitutes the core of the new moral universe. Notions of ‘can do’ increasingly 
dominate definitions of problems of development as well as responsibility.  
 
The other implication of this shift relates to the deeper issues of self-
understanding and representation. For many agencies and staff members these 
changes confronted earlier views and practices. Almost overnight their thematic 
and regional expertise became a liability. While for many development 
institutions ‘corporate identity’ had in the past constituted of a specific political 
awareness and loyalty to international networks, this suddenly changed. 
Experience now often became a burden for the very agencies in which it had 
matured. Transformation was often drastic and sometimes even virulent. In the 
early 1990s sometimes harsh measures were used in countries such as 
Netherlands to transform development agencies into ‘businesses of 
commitment’, with the sacking of all staffs, inviting most of them 
simultaneously to submit an application for a new job. The pained remarks made 
by a senior staff member of an international development organization may 
illustrate the intensity of this transformation:  
 
Now that it has become clear that my agency is starting to seriously stress the 
‘quality’ of development projects, it is better for me to go.  The knowledge of 
the region I have gained in the last twenty years and the many friendships I 
have built up in the course of my work clearly have become an obstacle.  
 
The ‘information’ collected in order to allow for judging interventions also 
reflects this new priority of agencies. The new ‘audit culture’ as it were creates 
its own specific body of ‘information,’ a new virtual reality of development 
(Baudrillard 1993; 1996; also Strathern 2000). We thus witness the constitution 
of a new myopia with the new regime of accountability.5 This myopia is quite 
comparable to the distortions of knowledge gathered in an earlier phase.  
Though there is no reason to romanticise the past as upholding of high ideals 
and search for purity in the past had led to high levels of willed ignorance and 
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destruction in the phase of state-led project of modernization and development, 
the valorisation of audit and accountability in contemporary uncritical 
fundamentalist turn to the market constitutes a crucial moral problem in the field 
of development (cf. Hobart 1993; Quarles van Ufford 1988).6
 
(b) The persisting smile of Icarus: The continuance of excessive optimism 
However, despite all these transformations in the discourse and practice of 
development interventions, much remains the same.  In the current phase of neo-
liberal domination and market-led development, managers are replacing 
politicians as confident architects of a new future We can note a remarkable 
continuity of rather excessive feelings of optimism about development--our 
ideas about transforming society through organised interventions have not 
diminished at all. A rather unreflexive optimism concerning our capacity to 
produce desired results has remained the same. 
 
At first sight the ideology of the market place stressing the role of subjectless 
social forces and the curious interventionist optimism are a very strange couple 
indeed. The stress on the market place as ‘hidden’ arbiter of progress and our 
high expectations concerning the management of desired results are clearly in 
contradiction.7 But still there is continuity because some of the core assumptions 
have remained the same: the notion of an unproblematic black box linking 
political goals with outcomes.  When we speak of a transformation we see that 
the direction of reasoning has changed. First the black box of administration was 
constructed “forwards,” starting from the notion of the rationality of specific 
political goals. Now the direction has changed: starting with the mythical notion 
of results the black box is constructed “backwards” as it were. Results cannot be 
separated from the target, nor the targets from the results. Forwards or 
backwards: there is continuity because the notion of a black box of 
administration of interventions in development has remained the same. 
 
c) From Unbounded Optimism to Critiques of Development as Hegemony and 
Violence 
In the last fifteen years we have witnessed a burgeoning critique of development 
as hegemony and violence (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990). In the past 
development sociologists and anthropologists had stressed the importance of 
their academic research for improving development interventions. But now 
critical scholars tend to focus on analysing the hegemonic relations which 
development entailed. This is sometimes perceived as a confrontation with the 
apparatus of development for the sake of it.  But this confrontation was then 
necessary to awaken the satisfied actors of development interventions out of 
their slumber. 
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At the same time, sustained scientific criticism, carried in itself and not 
accompanied by a passion of reconstructive responsibility, entails a process of 
social closure (Little 2000; Little & Painter 1995).  Many a time, academic 
critics of development intervention reflect in mirror image the development 
practices they study. But what is to be noted at the same time is that pioneers of 
post-structuralist critiques of development reflect an awareness of limits of 
academic criticism and embody a passion for engagement. Therefore it is no 
wonder then that Ferguson titles the epilogue to his admirable ethnographic 
interrogation of the logic of interventionist development, “What is to be done?”. 
In this Ferguson discusses with verve and passion what different actors in the 
field of development can do.  What is quite striking is that one of the very first 
forms of engagement that Ferguson wants critical development anthropologists 
to take part in is political contestation in one’s society. This has the potential to 
overcome the self-other dichotomy lying at the heart of the discourse of 
developmentalism. Participation in political struggles in one’s society around 
such issues as human rights, multicultural recognition, the problem of the 
homeless and the refugees, can make development anthropologists realize that it 
is not only people of the so-called Third World that are the objects of their 
critical attention and participation but also the deprived fellow citizens of their 
home countries. But while Ferguson writes without any second thought about 
the need for political participation in one’s country, he quite rightly proceeds 
with caution about prospects for such engagement in the field: “Whether such a 
useful and appropriate role is available to researcher in the ‘field,’ however must 
remain in every case an open question” (Ferguson 1990: 286). Ferguson here 
suggests that critical development anthropologists should “seek out typically 
non-state forces and organizations that challenge the existing dominant order 
and to see if links can be found between [anthropologists’] expertise and their 
practical needs as they determine them” (ibid).  But what is to be noted that 
Ferguson does not rule out from the beginning the prospect for working with 
state and international agencies in a creative manner as he himself writes: 
“There are no doubt circumstances under which work for state and international 
agencies would meet these conditions” (ibid). 
 
The pleas for engagement also comes out forcefully in the passionate reflections 
of Arturo Escobar who urges us in the very last section of his book entitled, 
“Ethnography, Cultural Studies and the Question of Alternatives” that one must 
not only resist the desire to formulate “alternatives at an abstract, macro level; 
one must also resist the ideas that the articulation of alternatives will take place 
in intellectual and academic circles, without meaning by this that academic 
knowledge has no role in the politics of alternative thinking” (Escobar 1995: 
222). Escobar’s own deconstruction of the apparatus of development has been 
inspired by not only post-structuralist theorists such as Foucault but also by 
critical movements in Latin America, Asia and Africa fighting against the 
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violent regimes of development. For Escobar, academic critique of development 
is not enough, it has to be accompanied by participation in critical political and 
cultural mobilizations for a new beginning as for him, “Social movements and 
anti-development struggles may contribute to the formation of nuclei of 
problematized social relations around which novel cultural productions may 
emerge” (ibid: 216). These social movements, among others, offers a “novel 
theorization of the political and its relation to both the cultural and the 
democratisation of social and economic life; the reformulation of the question of 
cultural identity in reconstructive ways; and a keen interest in relation between 
aesthetics and society” (ibid: 218; emphasis added). 
 
 
From Deconstructive Critiques to Reconstructive Responsibility: 
Socio-Political Struggles, Self-Cultivation and Learning 
 
But such a mode of engagement still calls for reflective critique not only as to 
the anti-systemic struggles of movements of empowerment but to the very logic 
and telos of power, i.e., whether the movements of empowerment and their 
sympathetic academic participants are using the language of empowerment to 
create a closure and to enhance one’s ego-aggrandizement and will to power.8 In 
his critique of power Foucault raises this issue of self-cultivation (discussed 
more elaborately in the later section of the essay) that both Ferguson and 
Escobar can build on for still deepening and broadening their project of 
engagement and giving the added flow of an ontological nurturance (see 
Dallmayr 2001a, 2001b). Ferguson and Escobar speak about all forms of 
engagement—political participation at home, working with and pitching one’s 
tent in the backyards of counter-hegemonic forces in the field, and not staying in 
the Hilton—but they do not realize that engagement also includes an 
engagement with oneself not only in terms of a demonised “self-reflexivity” but 
also in terms of developing oneself aesthetically and ethically, acknowledging 
the limits of human finitude and the calling of transcendence, and developing 
the capacity for self-emptying with regard to both individual and institutional 
will to power. In this context, Eisenstadt’s recent insightful critique of Foucault 
suggests the pathways of a new engaged anthropology where engagement also 
includes self-engagement: 
 
While the term “parrhesia” as used by Foucault goes beyond the simple 
emphasis on resistance as due mainly to the inconvenience of being confined 
within the coercive frameworks of an order and denotes the courageous act of 
disrupting dominant discourses, thereby opening a new space for another 
truth to emerge—not a discursive truth but rather a “truth of the self,” an 
authentication of the courageous speaker in this “eruptive truth-speaking”—it 
does not systematically analyze the nature of the agency through which such 
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other truth may emerge, or how the emergence of such “truth of the self” may 
become interwoven with process of social change and transformation  
 
(Eisenstadt 2002: 38). 
 
Escobar writes in almost the last sentence of his book, “For what awaits both the 
First and the Third World, perhaps finally transcending our difference, is the 
possibility of learning to be human in post-humanist (post-man and postmodern) 
landscapes” (Escobar 1995: 226).  The possibility of learning calls for self-
engagement as well as participation in social movements and the public sphere. 
It is interesting that in his recent formulation of what he calls Third 
Enlightenment, which is based upon a fallibilistic conception of reason, Hilary 
Putnam (2001) urges us to realize that despite setbacks learning has been 
possible in history. For Putnam, Foucaudian critiques of institutions miss this 
possibility of learning in history. But Escobar starting with Foucault concludes 
with a calling for learning across the boundaries.  This itself suggests that a 
more creative border-crossing is possible if we let ourselves from an either / or 
approach and engage ourselves with learning, learning to be. 
 
Escobar speaks about “learning to be human in post-humanist landscapes.”  But 
what is the meaning of posthuman here? Should Foucault’s critique of 
humanism be taken at face value or should we explore the link between 
Foucault’s critique and the humanistic strivings of savants such as Erasmus 
especially as Erasmus urges us to move beyond a power-model of the human 
condition and cultivate shraddha, reverence for life (cf. Das 1991; Dallmayr 
2001b; Giri 2002). It is Foucault himself who has written: “[...] for Nietzsche, 
the death of God signifies the end of metaphysics, but God is not replaced by 
man and the space remains empty” (Foucault quoted in Carrette 1999: 85). This 
empty space has, at least, three possibilities; the humanization of divine, 
divinisation of the human including overcoming the limits of anthropocentrism, 
and existence of radical evil in between the lines. Engagement with 
development, in spite of our locations, has to touch this entire spectrum. 
 
 
Rethinking Development: Towards an Alternative Genealogy and Ontology 
 
Escobar’s critique of interventionist development presents us the march of a 
continuous hegemony. But this is only part of the story. It is also possible to 
have an alternative history of the enterprise of development, beginning with 
moments of hope. Here we build on both Kant and Foucault (1984a) in creative 
ways and explore the pathways of an alternative genealogy of development. As 
is well-known, Kant had put the following questions as central to our human 
condition in general and the Enlightenment project in particular: what can we 
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know, what can we do and what can we hope for? Using the Kantian distinctions 
of hope, politics and critical understanding, we can distinguish three historical 
settings and to a certain extent phases. In our alternative genealogy of 
development, we look at our post-war tryst with development in terms of three 
phases: hope, politics and critical understanding. In each historical setting the 
concept of development entails priority given to one specific kind of knowledge. 
In the early years primacy was allotted to development as hope. In subsequent 
decades dominant attention was commanded by development as politics and 
administration. And during the past ten years or so, as we have seen, it is 
development as critical understanding of development practice itself which has 
received the key emphasis. In each of the phases the moral nature of 
development has been defined in a different and distinctive way.  
 
 
Development as works of hope (1944-1947) 
 
Development constituted a new moral universe for international relations 
emerging at the end of World War II. The concept was first used in Los Angeles 
in 1944 in one of the subcommittees preparing for the constitution of the United 
Nations (Van Soest 1975). The idea of development became the carrier of an 
almost exclusive preoccupation with the global future.  Development embodied 
a new beginning in hope against the cataclysmic experiences of World War II 
and against the backdrop of an expanding decolonisation of the globe. 
 
Michael Ignatieff (1999) has called our attention to two specific characteristics 
of the context. He speaks of the political arena around 1946 and 1947. His 
remarks help us to see how practices of hope could assert themselves for some 
time. Ignatieff’s observations about the constituting of The Declaration of 
Human Rights are pertinent to understanding the birth of the idea of 
development. He speaks of certain stillness, of a short period in which the arms 
of war and global power struggles were laid to rest. At 1946/47 the Cold War 
had not yet fully come to predominate the political agenda. The struggle for 
global hegemony had not yet asserted itself in the domains of the United Nations 
in 1947. Thus the shock about the terrible past still allowed for some space for 
articulating commonly defined hope for a better future. There was a moment of 
certain stillness between political ebbs and flows of war, cold and hot. This 
‘armistice’ allowed for atonement, contemplation and a dream of common 
global responsibility and human rights to be articulated.  Development also 
originated in this moment of stillness and hope and not in the hegemonic agenda 
of US President Truman though one was not totally separated from the other. 
 
This reading of the birth of the idea development is corroborated by two 
influential commentators of our time: Ralph Dahrendorf and Jurgen Habermas. 
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Dahrendorf (1968) was one of the first to link the idea of development with the 
crisis of the past and war. Almost thirty years later Habermas (1998a) calls our 
attention again to the links now between deep, cataclysmic transformations and 
the shaping of a new moral perspective of development. He mentions 
specifically the year 1945 in which colonial empires were collapsing, the war 
had ended and the shock over the holocaust was there to stay for a considerable 
time. This year ‘has set free energies and finally, even insights’ (Habermas 
1998a: 312). Cataclysmic events led to important universal moral insights.  
 
 
Development as practices of politics and administration (1949-) 
 
The universal call of development as hope--the ‘never again’--and the values 
generated in the first phase call for action. As hope had given a new sense of 
direction, modes of ‘doing development’ were now called for. This is what the 
second phase is all about. Development here enters the domains of politics, of 
application and administration and the key question becomes: Who must take 
the lead? The answer to the question of agency has varied over the years: while 
initially the thrust was on state and benevolent international donors, initiative 
passed to non-governmental organisations and the market. But despite the 
shifting trajectories of application of development: from state to market via the 
NGOs, each of these trajectories evinces a characteristic emphasis on doing. 
 
In the earlier years of ‘doing’, political action had still some connection with 
dreaming and hoping. The magnum opus of Gunnar Myrdal (1968), Asian 
Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, written in the early sixties is a 
telling case in point. Myrdal makes explicit reference to the new values, which 
have been emerging as a frame of reference for action. But it is not yet clear 
what kind of practical political agenda emerges from these values. He asks 
himself the question which course of action, which practical problems of 
development must be given priority over and against the other options. Must 
priority be given to the issues of still weak states and to strengthening their 
capacity of national planning? Or is a more full attack on poverty more 
advisable? The three volumes clearly allow us to discern the intellectual and 
political struggle of translating new general and universal values and dreams 
into distinctive international political agendas. 
 
This struggle did not last. After some time the enterprise of development 
became completely divorced from such encumberments. The machinery of 
various political creeds each entailing its distinctive planning, policy 
formulation and application of development became increasingly self-contained, 
cut off from any meaningful relationships to other practices such as 
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development as hope and development as critical understanding. A process of 
social, moral and intellectual closure set in.9  
 
The context of emphasising the ‘doing’ of development gave rise to 
‘development ethics’ as a professional engagement. Development ethics came to 
be defined as a moral calling for the continued adherence to universal moral 
views and commitments when these narrowed down into the practices of 
political applications (cf. Goulet 1995). As the values evaporated these calls 
became more urgent. Development ethics concerned itself with the issue of 
linking the domains of hope and values to the many practical issues of politics 
and administration (Gasper 1999). But in this phase, issues of ethics also became 
increasingly narrowed into the technical and professional domains, which it 
addressed. Often issues of morality were narrowed in the domains of 
administration: definitions of ‘mission statements,’ defined identities of 
development agencies, certifications of good development practice etc. Moral 
issues increasingly obtained an instrumental significance. Moral choices thus 
become important political assets of specific agencies, constituting their 
‘symbolic capital’ in the market place (cf. Hoebink 1988). The engagement of 
development as doing in the end came to predominate the agenda of 
development ethics.  
 
 
Development as critical understanding (1990- ) 
 
As we have seen with Ferguson and Escobar, about fifteen years ago, critical 
students increasingly disengaged themselves from the political and 
administrative concerns of development. They were rather more interested in 
showing that development projects are hegemonic and violent. In their 
engagement with development they reflected a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (cf. 
Bellah et al. 1991). This suspicion was not only of academic origin but was 
inspired by critical social movements fighting against the interventionist 
development projects such as the building of dams and mines which destroy 
people’s homes and habitats.  
 
But following the logic of only a “hermeneutics of suspicion” constitutes a 
fundamental moral problem as this does not deal with the relationship between 
critique and reconstruction. A moral critique of development calls for accepting 
responsibility for establishing a meaningful relationship between critique and 
reconstruction. In this context, the “hermeneutics of suspicion” in contemporary 
critiques of development needs to be supplemented by a “hermeneutics of 
recovery” (cf.. Bellah et al. 1991; Giri 2002a, 2002b). Development as critical 
understanding is vital to reconstituting development as global responsibility 
especially as it makes us aware of hegemonic intentions and relationships 
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parading in the name of global solidarity but in itself is not enough it needs to be 
radically and transformationally supplemented by reconstructive activities. To 
put it in the words of David Harvey, critics have to be “insurgent architects” 
with a desire to “translate political aspirations across the incredible variety and 
heterogeneity of socio-ecological and political-economic conditions” (Harvey 
2000: 246).  
 
 
Towards an Alternative Ontology of Development  
 
Development as hope, as politics and administration, and as critical 
understanding does not constitute only, or primarily, historical phases, they also 
constitute an alternative ontology of development.  The discourse and practice of 
development consist of domains of hope, politics and administration, and critical 
understanding. Autonomous as well as interconnected knowledges and actions 
arise in these domains. But these domains though autonomous already 
presuppose the other in their constitution, genealogy and dynamics. The domain 
of development as hope has or ought to have within itself an awareness of the 
issues emerging from domains of politics and application, and critical 
understanding. The same simultaneous logic of autonomy and interpenetration is 
true of domains of politics and critique. These domains exist as intersecting 
circles not in terms of a binary logic of either or but in terms of a multi-valued 
logic of autonomy, mutual presupposition and constitution, and interpenetration 
(Mohanty 2000; Uberoi 2002).10      
 
While historically the post-war tryst with development seems to have proceeded 
in a phase-like manner--first development as hope, then development as politics 
and applications and then development as critical understanding--now we need 
not proceed in a teleological manner. In fact now historical teleology might be a 
problem and instead of a logic of succession we have to think of a logic of 
simultaneity where creative and critical action in development can start from 
any of the domains defying the arrogant logic of a priori privileging of either 
one or the other. Different concerned actors of development inhabit in a 
significant manner one or two of the domains of development but though they 
belong to a specific domain their very domain already contains, sometimes as a 
possibility and invitation, the spirit of the other.11 The practitioners in specific 
domains of development have a responsibility to realize this mutually 
interpenetrative dimension of their specific vocation, discover their latent and 
possible universality and realize it in practices of labor and learning in the 
interactive and intersecting field of development. 
 
But who are the actors of development as hope, politics and critical 
understanding? Without essentializing and exhausting the list, we can find that 
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at the contemporary juncture the field of development consists of four different 
kinds of actors--state, market, social movements and voluntary organizations, 
and self. But as participants in the field of development they have the same 
multi-valued logic of autonomy and interpenetration. They do not exist in this 
field as pure categories and become reconstituted as being part of a field. Take 
for instance the category of the state. State has been a hegemonic actor in the 
interventionist models of development but because of resistant as well as 
creative work of social movements, states themselves are being forced to 
transform themselves (Kothari 1988; Mohanty et al. 1998). Movements such as 
Narmada Bachao Andoloana and the anti-mining struggle in Kashipur, Orissa 
contest the working of state, and also market, as pure categories and interrogate 
their arrogant desire for categorical self-assertion even if they do not succeed in 
realizing a full-fledged humanizing transformation of state in the directions of 
rights, justice and responsibility. But while offering critical resistance and 
creative alternatives to state, social movements also face a challenge of radical 
self-reflection. Many of the contemporary movements have fought for 
empowerment of deprived and dispossessed groups and their struggle has 
certainly made a welcome difference to the logic of distribution of power and 
democratization of previous hierarchical relations. But social movements at the 
same time need to cultivate within themselves a self-critique of the telos of 
power so that a politics of empowerment does not become an end onto itself and 
does not degenerate into another system of exclusion and oppression (cf. Laclau 
1992; Giri 2001; Tagesson forthcoming). For this there is a need for a 
transformative interpenetration between ethics and politics in the social 
dynamics as well as scholarly reflections on social movements as harbingers of 
new beginnings in the world of development. 
 
Thus in the intersecting and interactive field of development there is a moral 
problem when categories and actors exist or are allowed to exist as pure 
categories. They are or have to be part of a process of interaction, dynamic 
interpenetration and mutual transformation leading to an emergent reconstitution 
of the very categories themselves such as state and social movements, and hope, 
politics and critique. This leads to an alternative and emergent ontology of 
development. Earlier ontological concerns with development have meant an 
essentialist and stable conception of development and applying this existing out 
there to different contexts. But now there seems to be an urgent need to break 
away from such an essentialist and fixed ontology and look at development as a 
heterogeneous field of action and imagination and a dynamic process of learning 
and transformation where ontologies emerge as much from fields of 
conversations and contestations as they are also initial participants in this 
interactive field.  Thus we subject ontologies themselves to a journey of 
homelessness and an epistemological practice of learning (cf. Dallmayr 2001; 
Vattimo 1999). This calls for going beyond privileging either epistemology or 
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ontology and embody an ontological epistemology of participation (cf. Giri 
2004a).  
 
 
Transforming Anthropological Practice and Moral Imagination 
 
(a) Being interested in empirical as well as moral narratives of development 
practice 
The critique and reconstruction of development that we propose calls for a new 
anthropology of development going beyond the prevalent distinctions between 
anthropology for development (where anthropology is uncritically for 
development practitioners) and anthropology of development (where 
anthropology critically looks at hegemonic relations in development 
interventions) (cf. Grillo & Stirrat 1997). This new anthropology of 
development is simultaneously a moral and empirical engagement embodying a 
transdisciplinary border-crossing not only between economics and anthropology 
but also between moral philosophy and anthropological ethnography. In dealing 
with development, as anthropologists writing morally sensitive and informed 
ethnographies of concrete development practices are our inevitable first step. 
We must not only describe the moral choices these actors make, study the rules 
of legitimation to which they refer in the concrete practices, the modes of 
dealing with concrete constraints, contradictions and dilemmas they face but 
also try and add our own emerging judgments about these moral practices. Here 
we follow a two-fold engagement: an engagement where ethnographic inquiry is 
informed by moral issues embedded in practice as well as broader frames of 
moral reflection, and modes of moral reasoning which are informed by empirical 
study of concrete practices. Following this double task urges us to break away 
from anthropology as a study of bounded groups and themes and reconstitute it 
as an open-ended inquiry into pathways of flows, paying close attention to both 
roots and routes and following the trajectories of both ethnographic and moral 
encounter.12 In such an anthropology of encounter the moral and the empirical 
are mutually transformed. 
 
Such a reconstituted anthropology has an eye for disjunctures that exist at the 
heart of development practice. It seeks to understand development as a fabric of 
practices confronted with some disjunctures which must be coped with in the 
daily routines, the everyday forms of development practice. It realizes the 
limitations of an unproblematic whole or predominance of one view over all 
others, say state over market, or market over all others. Administrative 
rationality cannot be attributed centre place in the development enterprise over 
and against the critical understanding and the practices of hope either. There is 
no reason to assume that ‘more’ or better in one domain will be beneficial to the 
other. T.S. Eliot, anthropologist as well, helps us phrase this problem: “Where is 
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the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in 
information” (Eliot 1969: 147). 
 
Such an anthropology needs new theoretical inspirations which help us go 
beyond preoccupation with an unproblematic whole or the morality of the black 
box. Here Focuault and Ankermit are helpful in providing us a new theoretical 
imagination.  In his reflection on Kant, Foucault (1984a) endorses Kant’s 
distinction between three domains of knowledge (knowledge related to political 
action, knowledge related to critical reflection, and knowledge related to hope) 
as constitutive of Enlightenment but urges us to acknowledge the lack of fit 
between them. Foucault also gives importance to hope but the emphasis on hope 
is not based on an uncritical universalising plan rather it arises out of 
acknowledgement of the difficulty of putting theory into practice both in the past 
and present.13 In his brilliant meditation on our contemporary predicament, 
Dutch historian and philosopher Frank R. Ankersmit also urges us to be aware 
of the role of contingencies in the construction and dynamics of generalising and 
unifying formulations about the human condition and human betterment. Both 
Foucault and Ankersmit problematize our assumptions of a coherent body of 
knowledge, urge us to attend to and describe disjunctures, and provide new 
directions in our search for meaningful interrelationships among bodies of 
knowledge. The history of the development enterprise as well as the field of 
development needs to be looked at as a contingent struggle between different 
kinds of knowledge, including the moral.  
 
(b) Turn to contingency: Modes of acknowledgement and modes of coping 
Foucault and Ankersmit help us to turn away from a historical and generalizing 
mode of thinking about ethics and development and understanding the 
significance of contingency. An awareness of contingency helps us to 
understand not only our situatedness in space and time but also the situatedness 
of our perspective. Contingency points to our embeddedness in many webs of 
relationships, which simultaneously determines and opens up spaces of 
possibilities.14 Taking contingency seriously helps us to realize that when we are 
dealing with a situation the history in which it is embedded is not only one of 
progress and order but also is a story of “shattered expectations” (Habermas 
1998b: 13). A turn to contingency frees us from alluring and false promises of 
progress, of creeds, which promise certainty and eternal meaning. Rather it 
enables us to have a much humbler view of progress and development stressing 
on the significance of “fallibilistic conception of knowledge” (Putnam 2001) and 
the need to creatively live with uncertainty, which in turn calls for us to abandon 
our habitual clinging to order and stability (Toulmin 2001). 
 
Contingency is not accidental. In fact it is an integral part of an awareness of 
contingency that concrete and diverse practices, as well as discourse and history 
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could have been different. As social theorist Nancy Weiss Hanrahan tells us: 
“...the outcomes of social processes are always contingent in that things could 
turn out otherwise (Hanrahan 2000: 35; also see Hawthorn 1991; Walker 1998).  
An awareness of contingency while making us attentive to the historicity of our 
action and perspective does not make us prisoners of history, it rather enables us 
to discover creative and less absolutist ways of overcoming the limitations of a 
particular, temporal and spatial situatedness. Our awareness of contingency does 
not absolve us from the specific responsibilities inherent in and emerging from 
each of the three domains. On the contrary, an awareness of contingency of 
being part of specific historical contexts may free us from all kinds of unrealistic 
assumptions. Each of the three bodies of knowledge which are pertinent to 
development--hope, politics (and administration), and scientific understanding--
is seen to be situated in a specific domain. We must look not only to what goes 
on within each of the domains. Each time we must try to be creative in searching 
for the appropriate relationship between them. The notion of contingency makes 
us aware that claims of hegemony by any of the three must be looked at with 
reservation.  
 
Acknowledgement of contingency is only a first step. The second question is the 
following: In what ways do people and institutions cope with the contingency of 
the practices in which they are engaged? What is their response to this often 
unexpected and painful awareness? On the one end of the scale, we can discern 
responses of ignoring, the negation of contingency. This extreme response is 
often accompanied with a high degree of optimism concerning the 
manageability of development. In the opening paragraphs we started with a 
preliminary discussion of the varying and transforming ‘regimes of optimism,’ 
those dominated by political actors and ideological points of view, as opposed to 
the more recent regimes of manageable development guided and controlled by 
accountants and their flock. On the other end of the scale of ways of coping with 
the notion of contingency, we may find various ‘ironic’ responses, sometimes 
accompanied by notions of political and moral relativism. 
 
(c) Emergent Ethics: Border Crossing Between Facts and Values 
In this article our engagement with moral issues in the routines of development 
as well as in their macro determinations and foundational constitution transcends 
preoccupation with ethics as a domain of rules and regulations and calls for a 
new approach to understanding ethical issues in development and its 
interventions. It is rarely realised however that the impasse in present-day 
development discourse also involves the impasse in thinking about development 
ethics. Development ethics as charted by Denis Goulet (1995) is concerned with 
the quest for certain rules and regulations, i.e. to search for ‘correct’ motivations 
and for certain modes of development policies. It is concerned with application 
of values.15 But as Gasper (1999: 54) tells us, such a preoccupation hides “the 
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tendency still to seek security and certainty through detailed pre-set plans and 
conditions.” But development ethics is not primarily a domain of application of 
values, a search for rules and regulations; rather, in our engagement 
development ethics is an effort to rethink ethics and rules in a new way where 
they embody our contingent responsibilities and care, rather than a generalising, 
‘universal’ principle.16
 
In this context, it is helpful to proceed with the idea of emergent ethics as a 
companion in our search for ways out of the present impasse in ethics and 
development. We submit the following elements of this emergent pathway: 
 
First, the idea of emergent ethics suggests that a moral understanding of 
development and its interventions cannot rest on generalised moral points of 
view, laws or a priori formulations. The emphasis on contingency implies a 
linking of moral views into a wider historical analysis. Emergent ethics seeks to 
understand how ethical views emerge, as it were, from efforts to come to terms 
with concrete practices. Emergent ethics implies a dialogical and dialectical 
relationship between the actors and the situation at hand, and between practices 
of normative reflection and critical empirical research. The fluidity of the term is 
thus consciously chosen. It points to the need for a Fingerspitzengefuhl, a kind 
of practical moral sensitivity.  
 
Emergent ethics thus emerges from a confrontation with the best possible data in 
a concrete historical situation. Emergent ethics is based on an emergent 
empiricism, which also looks at data as part of an emergent situation, an 
emergent empiricism, which is helpful when moral reasoning becomes 
hegemonic. This leads to our second point that the notion of emergent ethics 
encompasses both the normative as well as the empirical dimensions of 
development and calls for a morally engaged ethnography. This in turn calls for 
border crossing between anthropology and moral philosophy. A plea for 
emergent ethics entails a willingness to engage in new kinds of dialogue with 
moral philosophers in order to escape from various forms of disciplinary myopia 
from which we suffer. Fortunately for us, we have fertile traditions to build on 
here both from anthropology and moral philosophy as exemplified in the works 
of Veena Das (1995a, 1995b; 1999), Clifford Geertz (2000), Marilyn Strathern 
(1988, 1992), Mark Hobart, Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2000) 
(also see Fischer 1999). 
 
Third, the question must be asked whose narratives and whose emergent 
horizons are we talking about? Development not only consists of different 
domains of actions and imaginations—hope, politics, and critical understanding 
but each of these domains has various kinds of actors—state, market, social 
movements / voluntary organization, and self. Emergent ethics calls for 
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attentiveness to an ethics which emerges out of openness to stories and points of 
view of all these actors, rather than an apriori assertion and violent exclusion of 
other horizons. The interventionist world of development has particularly not 
been open to the suffering of the people who have been violated by imposition 
of monological development projects such as building of big dams and mines.  
Here, emergent ethics calls for an embodied sensitivity to such narrations of 
suffering and in the process transforming itself into an ethics of friendship and 
responsibility (cf. Giri 2002b).17
 
Fourthly, emergent ethics requires public space, an agora, where all citizens may 
meet.18 Border crossing is an engagement for all active in the domains of 
development. More is needed than new forms of academic collaboration.  It calls 
for new kinds of linkages between the domains of politics and of critical 
understanding. Emergent ethics implies a call for breaking the processes of 
social closure, which have encapsulated each of the three domains—hope, 
politics and critical understanding. 
 
Fifth, the notion of emergent ethics calls for acknowledgment of tensions 
between two sides of development: care of self and care of other, ethics as well 
as aesthetics.  
 
 
Ethics, Aesthetics and Responsibility 
 
Emergent ethics pleads for a simultaneous cultivation of ethics and aesthetics 
and attentiveness to responsibility. In our experience with development 
interventions we find that an ethical agenda has almost always implied an 
agenda of the care of the other in a hegemonic manner where what is good for 
the other has already been defined by the benevolent Self. In fact, the problem 
with the practice of development in the last 50 years has been precisely with 
such an ethical agenda which has been an agenda of hegemonic application of a 
priori formulations in which the objects of development do not have much say in 
defining and shaping the contours of their development (Carmen 1996). Such an 
agenda makes development an other-oriented activity where the actors of 
development do not realize that the field and the practice of development 
provides, and ought to provide, an opportunity for learning (cf. Maturana 1980; 
Melucci 1996; Nederveen Pieterse 2001), self-development and self-
transformation both for the object and the subject of development.  In this 
context, there is a need to rethink development as an initiative in self-
development on the part of both the subjects and objects of development, and 
ethics not only as an engagement in care of the other but also as an engagement 
in care of the self. Such a redefinition and reconstruction of both ethics and 
development is a crucial starting point for a new understanding and 
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reconstitution of development as a shared human responsibility, and as a shared 
human possibility. 
 
Rethinking development from the vantage point and practice of self-
development urges a shift of perspective from us: a shift from looking at 
development as ameliorating the condition of the other to looking at it as an 
initiative in self-development. Self-development here refers to the self-
development of both the agents of development as well as subjects, the so-called 
target groups of interventions. In contemporary rethinking of welfare and well-
being in advanced industrial societies, we are told that without the development 
of an “autotelic self” which takes upon itself the responsibility of one's 
development and for taking oneself out of the trap of poverty and unfreedom, no 
amount of development intervention and welfare work can help alter the initial 
situation of poverty and helplessness (Giddens 1994, 1999). At the same time, 
those who are engaged in developing others and creating a more capable and 
functioning environment have a need to develop themselves. Though in the 
contemporary late-capitalistic, neo-liberal redefinition of welfare, emphasis on 
self-development has many a time manifested itself in a politics of 
irresponsibility (cf. Bauman 2001), of blaming the victim for her failure, this 
particular manifestation should not deter us from realizing the potential that a 
quest for self-development today has in transgressing the boundaries between 
self and other, subject and object in interventions of welfare and initiatives of 
development. Fortunately for us, there have taken place important movements in 
the development field such as Swadhyaya and Sarvodaya which reiterate that 
development is not only meant for the other, it is also meant for the self and in 
development, both the development of the other and development of self should 
go hand in hand (Roy 1993; Sheth 1994; Giri 2004b). 
 
The emphasis on self-development in the field of development practice is 
accompanied by an aesthetic deepening of the agenda of ethics where care of the 
self as an artistic work par excellence becomes the heart of ethics. Traditionally, 
we look at ethics as concerned with the consequences of one's action for the 
other. But ethics as care of the self urges us to realize that our action also affects 
ourselves and through care of the self, we are able to become worthy helpers and 
servants of the other. Such a deepening of the agenda of ethics draws its most 
immediate inspiration from Michael Foucault who urges us to realize that “the 
search for an ethics of existence” must involve an “elaboration of one’s own life 
as a personal work of art” (Foucault 1988: 49).  Foucault’s agenda of an 
aesthetic ethics is developed in the context of his discussion of ethical life and 
ethical ideals in Antiquity. But this is not meant only to be archaeology of the 
past but suggest a possible mode and ideal of ethical engagement for the present 
and the future. For Foucault, in Antiquity, “the search for an ethics of existence” 
was “an attempt to affirm one’s liberty and to give to one’s life a certain form in 
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which one could recognize oneself, be recognized by others, and which even the 
posterity might take as an example” (ibid). For Foucault, life as a work of art 
involves care of the self, a conversion to self, an intense relation with oneself. 
While ethics is usually conceived as care for the other, for Foucault, ethics at the 
same time, must help one to “take oneself as an object of knowledge and a field 
of action, so as to transform, correct, and purify oneself, and find salvation” 
(1988: 42). Furthermore, aesthetic ethics as care of the self involves cultivation 
of appropriate values in the conduct of life. The most important task here is not 
to be obsessed with exercising power over others and to be concerned with 
discovering and realizing “what one is in relation to oneself” (ibid: 85). 
 
Foucault’s call for self-restraint vis-à-vis ones’ work of power is particularly 
salutary in the field of development where agents of development have sought to 
impose their own will and models on the targets of development interventions. 
Through development of self-control the actors of development can resist the 
temptation to unnecessarily meddle in the lives of those with whom they are in 
interaction and thus facilitate their self-flourishing and self-unfoldment. For 
Robert Chambers, “it implies that uppers have to give up something and make 
themselves vulnerable” (Chambers 1997: 234). An engagement in self-control 
also enables actors of development to be aware of the hegemonic implications of 
a project of ethics, which is primarily prescriptive. It enables them to 
continuously seek to transcend the world of separation between the creators of 
development and the beneficiaries of such a creation. Recently Majid Rehenema 
who has applied Foucault’s insights in going beyond the impasse of 
contemporary development interventions has called for a “bottom up aesthetic 
order” in development at the heart of which lies a desire on the part of the actors 
to be true to themselves and develop their “inner world” and challenge the 
distinction between the makers of the worlds of beauty, truth and goodness and 
those who enjoy their benefits. In such a bottom-up aesthetic reconstruction of 
development, “Right action involving others starts always as a personal work on 
oneself. It is the fruit of an almost divine kind of exercise, which usually takes 
place in the solitude of thought and creation” (Rehenema 1997: 401). 
 
An aesthetic deepening of the agenda of development can also draw inspiration 
from Ankersmit’s recent plea for what he calls “aesthetic politics” (Ankersmit 
1996). For Ankersmit, while “ethics makes sense on the assumption of a (Stoic) 
continuity between our intentions, our actions and their results in the socio-
political world,” aesthetics draws our attention to the gaps and discontinuities 
among them (1996: 44). Ankermit makes a distinction between mimetic 
representation, which denies this gap between representation and represented 
and aesthetic representation which acknowledges this gap and builds on it. For 
Ankersmit, mimetic representation is against representation itself as 
“representation always happens, so to, speak, between the represented and its 
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representation; it always needs the presence of their distance and the ensuring 
interaction.” (Ankersmit 1996: 44). The problem with modernist politics for 
Ankersmit has been that it has been a hostage to the politically correct ideology 
of mimetic representation where political representatives are required to mirror 
the expectations of their constituency. This creates a compulsion for politically 
correct mimetic representation rather than a representation, which is based on 
one’s autonomous self-identity and negotiation between this identity and the 
aspirations of the represented. For Ankersmit, acknowledgment of this gap 
becomes an aesthetic work par excellence where actors learn to develop an 
appropriate political style in the midst of fragmentation rather than with a 
valorised united whole, which does not exist any more. Aesthetic political 
representation urges us to realize that “the representative has autonomy with 
regard to the people represented” but autonomy then is not an excuse to abandon 
one’s responsibility. Aesthetic autonomy requires cultivation of 
“disinterestedness” on the part of actors, which is not indifference.19 To have 
disinterestedness i.e, to have "comportment towards the beautiful that is devoid 
of all ulterior references to use—requires a kind of ascetic commitment; it is the 
'liberation of ourselves for the release of what has proper worth only in itself'" 
(Osborne 1997: 135). 
 
In aesthetic politics, the development of appropriate styles of conduct on the part 
of the representatives is facilitated by the choice and play of appropriate 
metaphors. For Ankersmit, in the development of an appropriate style of 
conduct for a representative the metaphor of a “maintenance man” or woman is 
more facilitating for self-growth than an architect. While the architect thinks that 
she is designing a building of which she is the creator, a maintenance person has 
a much more modest understanding of one's role and does not look at his effort 
as creating a building out of nothing, rather continuing a work to which many 
others have contributed.  Such a metaphor of “maintenance man” can provide 
new self-understanding to actors both in the field of politics and development 
where we do not have any dearth of actors, institutions and worldviews who 
attribute to them the role of the original creator, the architect, the god. But such 
a self-understanding of ourselves as architects often leads to arrogance and 
dominance. In this context, there is modesty in the metaphor of the 
“maintenance person” which is further facilitated by the choice of the metaphor 
of the captain of a ship. It is not enough for a captain to have only an a priori 
plan; she must know how to negotiate between a priori plans and the contingent 
situations on the ground. Such a capacity for negotiation which is facilitated by 
one's choice of an appropriate metaphor such as captain and “maintenance 
person” is crucial for development of appropriate styles of conduct on the part of 
the actors in the field of politics and development. In developing his outline of 
aesthetic politics, an outline which has enormous significance for reconstituting 
the field of development as a field of artistic rather than mimetic representation 
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which in turn calls for the cultivation of an appropriate style of life on the part of 
the actors of development, Ankersmit writes: “...when asking himself or herself 
how best to represent the represented, the representative should ask what 
political style would best suit the electorate. And this question requires an 
essentially creative answer on the part of the representative, in the sense that 
there exists no style in the electorate that is quietly waiting to be copied (ibid: 
54). For Ankersmit, “aesthetics will provide us with a most fruitful point of 
departure if we desire to improve our political self-knowledge” and in this self-
knowledge autonomy of actors, units and institutions has a crucial significance. 
In fact, nurturing the autonomous spaces of self, institutions and society itself as 
spaces of creative self-fashioning and development of creative styles of action 
becomes an aesthetic activity par excellence. Of course, autonomy here has not 
to be meant in a defensive sense of preserving the established structures rather 
than transforming it in accordance with the transformative imagination of actors 
and a democratic public discursive formation of will. 
 
Ankersmit’s application of the perspective of aesthetics in the field of politics 
has important lessons for us in reconstituting development as a field of shared 
responsibility. Aesthetic politics in Ankersmit is not geared to a will to power 
but inspired by a will to political self-knowledge and the will to develop oneself 
as a “maintenance man”. As against the tyranny of unity in certain strands of 
German aesthetics such as Schiller’s, Ankersmit's aesthetics celebrates and 
works “within an irrevocably broken world” (Ankersmit 1996: 53) but the 
brokenness of the world is not an excuse to abandon one's responsibility. This is 
facilitated by further creative elaborations of an aesthetic mode of engagement 
by Charles Taylor (1991) and Seyla Benhabib (1996) where aesthetics is 
characterized by both quest of authenticity as well as striving for establishing 
non-domineering relationships with others (also see Scarry 1999; Welsch 1997). 
In the words of Benhabib: “The overcoming of the compulsive logic of 
modernism can only be a matter of giving back to the non-identical, the 
suppressed, and the dominated their right to be. We can invoke the other but we 
cannot name it. Like the God of the Jewish tradition who must not be named but 
evoked, the utopian transcendence of the compulsive logic of Enlightenment and 
modernism cannot be named but awakened in memory. The evocation of this 
memory, the ‘rethinking of nature in the subject’ is the achievement of the 
aesthetic” (Benhabib 1996: 333). 
 
Our engagement with various new ways of understanding the work of aesthetics 
has important lessons for us in thinking about and relating to the field of 
development. First, aesthetics as sensitivity to configurations of togetherness 
without reducing it to an a priori plan or teleology of order can help us to look at 
the field of development as a field of togetherness. But this togetherness is not a 
product of an ordered plan nor is it teleologically geared to production of order. 
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A preoccupation with order has led to dangerous consequences in the field of 
development where leaders have deliberately tried to put conflict, ambiguity and 
contradictions under carpet. It has also led to a denial of the work of 
contingencies in developmental dynamics. Aesthetics as openness to the 
contingent also helps us overcome the creed of certainty and better prepare 
ourselves for appreciating the work of uncertainty in the developmental world 
and fashion an appropriate mode of action and management, which reflects such 
a concern. For instance, recently Lyla Mehta, Melissa Leach and her colleagues 
at Institute of Development Studies, Sussex have urged us to explore new 
directions in natural resource management which takes uncertainty of people’s 
lives—ecological uncertainty, livelihood uncertainty, and knowledge 
uncertainties—seriously and in this engagement an aesthetic awareness 
compared with a positivist preoccupation with regulation can help us too (Mehta 
et al. 1999). Finally aesthetics as artistic representation rather than mimetic 
representation can enable us first to understand the mimetic nature of most of 
development interventions and then encourage us to cultivate various alternative 
ways of coming out of this closed mimetic world. One aspect of the mimetic 
character of the contemporary world of development interventions is that the 
representatives of development are self-confident that they can represent the 
interest of the donor agencies on the one hand and beneficiaries on the other in a 
transparent and unproblematic manner. But such assumption condemns them to 
a world of self-created continuity while the field of development is characterized 
by lack of fit between intentions and outcome. And with aesthetic sensibility 
once the representatives realize the practical and moral untenability of such a 
mimetic world they can engage themselves with various modes of aesthetic 
ethics and politics, which enable them to articulate the interests of donors and 
beneficiaries in a more responsible manner. 
 
But as these are some of the potential for renewing development practice with 
an engagement with aesthetics, unfortunately there are some fundamental limits 
to it too. One of these relates to a narrow valorisation of care of the self in an 
aesthetic engagement, a valorisation, which does not take seriously and is even 
blissfully oblivious of its responsibility to others (cf. Krishna 1996). In fact, this 
problem lies at the core of the Foucauldian care of the self. As Gardiner helps us 
realize: “In Foucault’s ontology of the subjects, there are only scattered and 
essentially gratuitous references to our relations with others, little real 
acknowledgment of the centrality of non-repressive solidarity and dialogue for 
human existence. One must not have the care for others precede the care of the 
self, he [Foucault] bluntly declares at one point” (Gardiner 1996: 38). Critical 
reflections on Foucault’s own scripting of life also points to a preoccupation 
with sadomasochism in his life which points to the limits of his aesthetic ethics 
(Miller 1993: 327). In this context, aesthetic ethics in itself cannot help us come 
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out of the impasse in which we are in the field of development and we need to 
engage ourselves with development as embodiment of responsibility.  
 
 
Ethics as Responsibility and the Face of the Other 
 
In our recent times, Emmanuel Levinas has been foremost in redefining the 
agenda of ethics as responsibility to the other.  For Levinas, ethical engagement 
involves transcendence where transcendence consists of a “passing over to 
being’s other, otherwise than being” (Levinas 1974: 3).  As Levinas tells us, in 
ethics “it is no longer a question of the ego, but of me. The subject which is not 
an ego, but which I am, cannot be generalized, is not a subject in general [...] 
Here the identity of the subject comes from the impossibility of escaping 
responsibility” (Levinas 1974: 13-14).  
 
Levinas’s ethics of the face has an inspiring parallel in the life and thoughts of 
Gandhi. Gandhi’s life embodied a multi-dimensional responsibility with 
multiple others—especially the suffering, violated and the marginalized—in a 
non-hegemonic way (Parekh 1997). As Srinivasan writes: “All his experiments, 
whether in the realm of caste, communal, race or gender relations sought to 
declassify the Untouchable--harijan, muslim, white or women through a non-
violent exchange” and establish solidarity of love with them (Srinivasan 1998: 
76). In his ashram at Sevagram, Gandhi had a leper-stricken old man as his 
fellow ashramite and his daily routine included cleaning his wounds. When 
Levinas writes that “the face is the other who asks me not to let him die alone” 
we find the embodiment of such an awareness in the life of Gandhi. After the 
partition of India Gandhi walked in the villages of Bengal reassuring faces living 
in the fear of death though this partly contributed to his later falling to the 
bulletins of an assassin. Gandhi elevates his concrete relationships with others to 
a heart-touching moral principle: 
 
I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self 
becomes too much with you, apply the following test.  Recall the face of the 
poorest and weakest man you have seen, and ask yourself if the step you 
contemplate is going to be of any use to him; will he gain anything by it?  
Will it restore him control over his own life and destiny?  In other words will 
it lead to Swaraj for the hungry and the spiritually starving millions? Then 
you will find your doubts and self melting away. 
 
 (Gandhi quoted in Chambers et al. 1989: 241) 
 
But Gandhian embodiment of responsibility is different from working out an 
apriori plan of ameliorating the suffering of the other.  Gandhi’s walks with 
others “was always (at the same time) an interior journey, an exploration of his 
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being, and not just the working out of a preestablished strategy” (Pillai 1985: 
77). “It is this insistent questioning of himself which distinguishes his actions 
from all self-sanctifying ‘social service’ based on representation.  Every 
decision for Gandhi was simultaneously the laying open of himself” (ibid). Thus 
in Gandhi an appropriate response to the face of the other requires appropriate 
preparation in self but such a simultaneous engagement is missing from Levinas.  
Levinas takes the readiness of self to look up to and die for the other granted and 
does not realize that self has to develop herself in appropriate way for such task 
of responsibility and martyrdom. 
 
The call for responsibility in Gandhi and Levinas has an esteemed predecessor 
in the inspiring reflections of Soren Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, ethics is a 
“mode of praxial engagement and life of commitment” (Schrag 1997: 120). 
Kierkegaard urges us to realize the limits of an aesthetic cultivation of self and 
understand the significance of ethics in providing a long-term commitment to 
the self. In Kierkegaard’s formulation, the life of an aesthete “falls apart into a 
series of disconnected moments” who “becomes sufficiently self-conscious 
about his socially given identity to stand back from it” (Rudd 1993: 96). 
However, the ethicist “consciously re-engages in the commitments and 
relationships of social life” (ibid). For Kierkegaard, a life of ethical commitment 
provides a constancy to the self which is achieved “through the bonding of self 
with other selves” (Schrag 1997: 19). Here it is important to realize the 
difference in emphases in Foucauldian ethics and Kierkegaardian ethics: “The 
integrity that is won through self-constancy is sustained not only through a 
proper relation of self to itself but also in and through self’s relations to other 
selves” (ibid). 
 
 
From Development as Freedom to Development as Responsibility  
 
This passionate call for responsibility has important lessons for us in 
reimagining and reliving development as a transformative practice.  It can help 
us reconstitute development as responsibility, which can provide a self-critical 
and transformative supplement to the contemporary redefinitions of 
development as freedom (Sen 1999). In his recent passionate reflections, 
Amartya Sen has urged us to reconstitute development as a “momentous 
engagement with freedom’s possibilities” (Sen 1999: 298). But Sen does not 
take his explorations of freedom’s possibilities in a self-critical direction of 
responsibility where one’s striving for freedom has within itself a space for 
criticism of the self-justificatory claims of one’s freedom.  In this context, a 
redefinition of human well-being in terms of “functioning” and “capability” of 
individuals and of development as freedom needs to be supplemented by a 
reconceptualisation and realization of development as responsibility where 
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freedom is an object of both ontological and social commitment. Embodiment of 
responsibility requires looking up to the face of the other and the mirrors of 
desires within oneself and going beyond the self-justificatory world of freedom 
itself. This, in turn, is facilitated by appropriate self-development. Development 
then means not only enhancing the functioning and capacity of bonded labourers 
or enhancing the life expectancy of disadvantaged groups such as the Afro-
Americans within an affluent society such as the US, as Sen argues,20 but also 
self-development on the part of the free agents where they do not just assert the 
self-justificatory logic of their own freedom but are willing to subject it to a self 
and mutual criticism and “undergo the suffering that would come to [them] from 
non-ego” (Levinas 1974: 123). In Sen, development as freedom is an end state 
but without the self-development of actors and institutions from freedom to 
responsibility there would be very little resources left to rescue human well-
being from the tyranny of freedom. 
 
But development as responsibility for the other is facilitated by appropriate self-
development. In the discourse of development as freedom there is little 
awareness of this. There is little awareness about this in pathway of ethical 
responsibility as charted by Levinas too. As we saw briefly in our dialogue with 
Gandhi, Levinas takes the readiness for self granted and thus in our effort to 
reconstitute development as a shared responsibility we have to go beyond 
Levinas while holding his very helpful and alchemical hands. In this context, it 
is helpful to keep in mind the differential inspiration of Gandhi and Levinas. 
While in the Gandhian path, there is a simultaneous work on self-development 
and attentiveness to the other, Levinas only speaks of one’s responsibility to the 
other and takes the task of self-prepartion for granted. In this context, the 
significance of aesthetic ethics lies precisely in stressing the point that 
attentiveness to and responsibility for the other requires appropriate self-
preparation. But then the task here is again to be on the guard so that our 
engagement with self-preparation does not degenerate into beautification of self. 
So, we deal with a contingent world here, and the task before us is to cope with 
the contingent challenge of self-development and responsibility to the other in a 
balanced and transformational manner.  
 
 
Development as Responsibility: Virtues of “Acknowledged Dependence” 
 
Development as responsibility consists of both attentiveness to the other and 
work on oneself. But in theory and practice there are many gaps between them 
and it is difficult to achieve a final solution to this problem. A creative way of 
coping with this problem is to cultivate what Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) calls 
“acknowledged dependence” in our practices of relationships. We need a new 
morality which acknowledges the disjunctions between different actors and 
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knowledges in the field of development but at the same time does not consider 
these disjunctions as destiny and strives to work with these and find a way out. 
To come to terms with it, there is a need to go beyond consequentialist and 
deontological ethics. The result-oriented morality in contemporary neo-liberal 
development practice is a variant of utilitarianism where the moral concern is 
external to the process of realization of results and the actors (Mohanty 2000; 
Thompson 2001). In place of such an externalist morality, we now need a 
morality and ethics of participation where “knowledge of” can never be 
dissociated from the process of “knowing with” (Sunder Rajan 1998). At the 
same time, we have to come to acknowledge that if consequentialism and result-
oriented morality cannot take us out of our moral predicament, the answer does 
not lie in an uncritical reiteration of a Kantian goal-oriented morality (Beck 
2000). A goal-oriented morality is also an externalist morality and it also leads 
to a “morality of black box.” In its place we now need a morality of 
participation, a field of participation, which has within its very heart the 
brokenness of the world. MacIntyre (1999) charts such a pathway for us with 
what he calls “virtues of acknowledged dependence.” 
 
For MacIntyre, to participate in any particular relationship, neither the language 
of self-interest nor the language of benevolence is enough. Instead, it requires a 
language of giving and receiving in which both the self and the other, other and 
the self are giver and receiver at the same time. To participate in such a 
relationship, there is a need to cultivate both virtues of giving and receiving, the 
virtues, which lie at the intersection of two other virtues, the virtue of generosity 
and justice.  While in the conventional understanding of virtues, these two 
virtues, i.e. the virtue of justice and the virtue of generosity, are looked at as 
different from each other and approached in isolation, for MacIntyre it is 
important to bring these two virtues together in our art of relationship. While the 
virtue of justice makes us aware what we owe to both the self and the other, the 
virtue of generosity helps us to move from conditional care to unconditional 
obligation both in our relationship with ourselves and in relationship to others. 
 
This mode of engagement of acknowledged dependence provides us a way out 
of the black box of being trapped either in goals or results, action or reflections 
in the world of development. It helps us to be attentive to dialectic between goal 
and result, the interaction between actors and target groups, others and self, and 
how interdependence is put into place in the practice of development. Such a 
perspective of acknowledged dependence also urges us to realize how 
meaningful action and evaluation in development depends on our capacity to 
acknowledge the relative significance and limitation of different modes of 
engagement such as development as hope, development as politics and 
application, and development as critical understanding and consisting of 
different actors of development such as self, voluntary organizations, market and 
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state. This also calls for realizing development as responsibility embodying 
ethics and aesthetics, self-cultivation and socio-spiritual struggles, a 
responsibility, which is aware of the contingent nature of our locations and the 
need for a transcendental and transversal opening of our vision. 
 
[This article builds on our collaborative work on development ethics, 
particularly our recently co-edited book on this theme, A Moral Critique of 
Development: In Search of Global Responsibilities.] 
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Notes 
 
                                                          
1  In fact environmental critiques have constituted an important aspect of moral critique of 
development. See Sachs 1999. 
2  Like Strydom, we owe the idea of co-responsibility to philosopher Karl-Otto Apel. Apel 
(2001) argues that to come to terms with ethical and moral challenges of our times neither 
indiviudal-centered micro-ethics nor society-centered macro ethics is enough. What is 
required is a planetary ethics of co-responsibility where all of us consider ourselves 
responsible to each other as member of a planetary community. Apel makes clear that this 
does not mean that all of us share the responsibility in the same manner. In a recent 
discussion, Apel also makes clear that “even if Iwas not the one who had ordered the war 
in Kosovo still I am not totally absolved of my responsibility” (personal communication). 
3  There is a long debate in Western philosophical traditon as to which is one is truly 
emnacipatory: moral or ethical. While Habarmas (1990) looks at ethical consciousness as 
embedded in taken-for-granted assumptions of society and looks upt to moral 
consciousness as suggesting critical edge, Levinas in his pathways of ethics as first 
philosophy suggests just the opposite. 
4  The isolation of the political process preceding interventions in development from the 
domains of outcomes of intervention has been well documented in the report “evaluation 
and monitoring” prepared by the Policy Evaluation and Review Unit of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the Hague (1993). The report concluded that evaluation had not impacted 
policy making in any discernable way. The conclusion was made on the basis of a relatively 
great number of case studies. For Dutch NGO’s a similar conclusion concerning the relative 
isolation of policy making from the domains of outcome had been made earlier on (Quarles 
1988). It was interesting to note how helpless the agencies were in amending the situation. 
More was apparently at stake than a ‘technical’ administrative problem.  
5  The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Netherlands recently called attention to serious flaws in the assessing of ‘result oriented 
development intervention’. Reliable empirical data for making a judgment were absent. 
While available data allowed for financial accountability “more data are needed for policy 
evaluations” (Yearly Report 2000: 1). The complaints may well indicate the problematic 
nature of the empiricist assumptions involved (cf. Hobart 1993; Gasper 2003). The ‘prices’ 
of transforming public organisations into business like operations have been analysed by 
Mintzberg (1989). See also: Jacobs (1993) and Quarles a.o. (1998). 
6  Joseph Stiglitz (2002) until recently with the World Bank himself talks about “market 
fundamentalism” in this case. 
7  It must be noted that some recent developments in the theory and practice of development 
such as the rise of social capital theory and institutional perspectives on market clearly calls 
for understanding this contradiction and making efforts at overcoming this (cf. Dasgupta & 
Serageldin 2000; Putnam et al. 1993). 
8  According to Teressa Brennan (1995), such a desire to control constitutes the core of 
social evil. 
9  This process of social closure has been well-documented. Quarles (1988), building on the 
seminal work of Mintzberg (1979) shows how in the 1980s the spending staff in some 
Dutch NGOs gained the upper hand over those responsible for learning through 
monitoring and evaluation. Another study of the learning capacity of government 
institutions came to a similar conclusion. A study of actual impact of evaluation on wider 
policy processes by the Dutch governments substantiated that norms and rules guiding the 
administrative machinery tend to become a world onto themselves and learning have a 
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limited role to play in the policy processes. The actual implementation is also cut off from 
the very people on whose support it depends. So donor spaces of hope, commitment and 
caring become increasingly sel-contained. 
10  Mohanty (2000) helps us understand the link between “multi-valued logic” and the idea of 
shared contents: “Different ‘worlds’ have shared contents” (Mohanty 2000: 24). And we 
can similarly say: Different worlds of development have shared content. Mohanty’s 
pathway of multi-valued logic finds an inspiring companion in Uberoi’s recent effort to go 
beyond the dualist logic of European modernity, buildings as he does on the Hermetic 
traditions of Europe, and his plea for a “four-valued logic of truth and method in place of 
the restrictd two-valued logic of dualism” (Uberoi 2002: 118). 
11  This way of thinking of relationship of autonomy and mutual interpenetration among 
domains finds a parallel in creative thinkers of our times such as R. Sunder Rajan’s 
formulation of the historiographical field as consisting of history as power, history as 
reason and history as vision, Iren van Staveren’s construction of the economic field as 
consisting of domains of market, justice and care, and Frederick Bath’s recent formulation 
about knowledge (cf. Barth 2002; van Staveren 1991 & Sunder Rajan 1996 ). For an 
illustration, we can appreciate the spirit of such a mode of inquiry by following closely 
what Barth writes: 
‘I am not inviting you to take a higly generalized and abstract unity (knowledge) and divide into 
three parts (sustantive corpus, communicative medium, and social organization) and then 
progressively break each of these parts down further till we finally arrive at the level of particular 
human actions and events. On the contrary, my theses is that these three faces of knowledge appear 
together precisely in the particulars of action in every event of the application of knowledge [..] 
Their mutual determination takes place at those specific moments when a particular item of 
substantive knowledge is cast in a particular communicative medium and applied in an actor by an 
action positioned in a particular social organization: their systematic interdependence arises by 
virtue of the constraints in realization that these three aspects impose on each other in the context 
of every particular application (Barth 2002: 3; italics in the original).’ 
12  Our pathway of development anthropology departs from many scholars who in their 
ethnography of development practice confine themselves with bounded groups. For 
example, in their ethnography of aid, Crew & Harrison write: “Our description and 
analysis is ethnographic in the sense that we are presenting our interpretation of patterned 
social relations within a conceptually bounded group of people” (Crew & Harrison 1998: 
6). The pathway we plead is for more border crossing but in this we do not sacrifice the 
logic of place to a logic of flows, or what Clifford Geertz warns: too quickly leaving roots 
“in favor of routes”. 
13  The allowing for hope to assume its place implies a willingness to confront the makings of 
crisis in the past. As Kekes (1992: 12) remarks: “True hope can follow only after we have 
faced evil, while false hope is fuelled by a denial of evil”. 
14  As David Harvey argues, “Contingency does not imply, however, that as opposed to the 
designer ideal, the actual architecture is secondary and constantly in danger of collapse. 
Rather, contingency insures that no architect is able to determine a design free from the 
relationship with the ‘other’—the client, staff, and other factors relevant to the design 
process” (Harvey 2000: 230). 
15  For Goulet, development ethics is the “cement that binds together multiple diagnoses of 
problems with their policy implications through an explicit [...] study of values” (Goulet 
1995: 27). This has led many scholars in the field to be concerned with the study and care of 
the application of certain developmental values. In this way ethics comes to be linked to a 
large extent with the quest for certain rules and regulations.  
16  In this context it is helpful her to think further about the influential theories of justice of 
John Rawls. The Rawlsian framework of justice constitutes historical way of thinking 
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about and relating to justice and in discovering our pathway we turn from this to a new 
mode of emergent ethics building on the important works of virtue ethics, virtue 
epistemology and care. Caring as a moral concern implies that we must confront all kinds 
of dilemmas and contradictions and should not be confined within ethics as a series of 
rules and regulations. This is missing in a justice approach to morality. As G.A. Cohen 
tells us: “In the case of Rawlsian doctrine, the relevant life is not mine in particular, but 
people’s life as such [...] egalitarian justice is only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a 
matter of the rules that define the structure of society, but also a matter of personal 
attitude and choice” (Cohen 2000: 3; also see Keeke 2002). 
17  A question here that faces us is if the idea of emergent ethics an implicit plea for 
relativism? How can development be a domain of global responsibility if the practices are 
all seen as contingent? The pathway of an emergent ethics does not necessarily lead to 
relativistic consequences. It does not empty our sense of global responsibility. On the 
contrary, the understanding of contingency may well become a stepping-stone for shared 
responsibility. Acknowledging different ways of coping with the very concrete problems 
at hand may help us to learn and move beyond our specific contexts. There are always 
choices to be made, learning processes must take place, insight in concrete constraints and 
possibilities for transformation may be gained. Thus we may move beyond the specific 
constraints, which we confront. This allows for transcending the specific situation and 
thus for universality.  And here emergent ethics not only involves border crossing between 
facts and values but questions any naïve and unproblematic universalization of values 
themselves by opening these to a trans-cultural and trans-civilizational interrogation and 
dialogue. 
18  But our conception of public space is different from Habermas. For us public space is not 
only a space of rational argumentation but also a space for sharing one‘s fear and anxieties 
among each other. But participating in such a public sphere requires self-cultivation in 
terms of listening to and acknowledgment of fear and anxiety in one’s life and life of  
others, of course as a prelude to searching a way out. Such a reconstituted conception of 
public sphere is particularly significant now as people in Europe feel that reigning 
ideologies of political correctness here does not allow them to talk about their fear openly 
in the public sphere. 
19  In a recent discussion with us (Aug. 8, 2001) Ankersmit makes the connection between 
aesthetic autonomy and the quest for freedom and the possibility of renewal in individual 
and social life clear. 
20  Amartya Sen writes: “African Americans in the United States are relatively poor compared 
with American Whites, though much richer than people in the Third World. It is, however, 
important to recognize that African Americans have an absolutely lower chance of reaching 
mature ages than do people in many third world societies, such as China, or Sri Lanka, or 
parts of India [...] If development analysis is relevant even for richer countries the presence 
of such inter-group contrasts within richer countries can be seen to be an important aspect of 
the understanding of development and underdevelopment” (1999: 6). 
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